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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050815-SC

vs.
JOHN VONDERHAAR HALTOM,
Defendant/Appellant.

—000O000—

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to § 782-2(3)(a) and § 78-2-2(5) U.C.A.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1 .Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that finding of simple negligence was
sufficient for conviction of the crime of dealing in materials harmful to a minor? On
certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness,
giving its conclusions no deference. State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305 (Utah
2005).

2. Does the evidence in this case, reviewed in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, prove a violation of the ordinance under which it was brought?
This issue was preserved for appeal by Defendant's Motion for Directed
Verdict (R. 677 p. 156; renewed, p. 307) and by Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. 4624). Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah
1994). A judgment must be upheld against a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence unless it is against the clear weight of the evident *>i unless llns Com)
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Spanish Fork
City v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 510 (Utah App. 1999). Defendant must
marshal the evidence in favor of the Plaintiff and show that it is not sufficient. See In
re Beasley. 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994).CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE
§ 76-10-1206 U.C.A.
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing
that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in
ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributed or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to
exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors;
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before
2

a minor that is harmful to minors; or
(c) intentionally participates in any performances before a minor, that is
harmful to minors.
§76-2-102 U.C.A.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state,
and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state
and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall
involve strict liability is the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable
mental state.
§ 76-2-103 U.C.A.
A person engages in conduct:
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of, but consciously
disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the results will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
ought to be aware of a substantial an unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all of the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.
3

§ 76-2-104
(1) If acting with criminal negligence is sufficient to establish the culpable
mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a
person acts intentionally or knowingly.
(2) If acting recklessly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for an
element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts
intentionally or knowingly.
(3) If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the culpable mental state for
an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person acts
intentionally.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant John Haltom was, at the time of the incident, a co-owner of a
business known as Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, located at 6885
South State Street in Midvale, Utah (R. 677 p. 154) This business involves the sale
of lingerie, swim wear, shoes and other clothing items, and novelties. Those
novelties run from lotions, oils and candles, to the more exotic. At the time of this
incident, they included "adult toys" or "marital aids" and some adult videos and
books. From the day that the opening of his store was announced, there has been
ongoing civil litigation between the City and Haltom over what could be sold, and on
4

what terms. See Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom. 2003 UT 26, 73 P.3d 334 (Utah
2003). Not long after the opening of the store, on August 4, 2000, Defendant was
charged with selling an adult videotape to a minor, a third degree felony.
The store in Midvale was set up in late July, 2000, and opened in the last week
of that month. Detective Dean Brimley of the Midvale Police sent an underage boy
into the store to try and obtain an adult video on August 1. The boy was met at the
door by an employee who requested I.D., and immediately turned him away. IdL p.
66. The second try, however, was successful, when the 17 year old daughter of a
police officer purchased an adult video.
Plaintiff s case in chief was presented by three witnesses. The first witness was
Brittany Pearson, the daughter of the former Midvale Assistant Police Chief. She had
volunteered to go into Doctor John's store, to see if she could purchase an adult video
(Id. pp. 27, 30-31). Upon entering the store on the afternoon of August 4, 2000, she
was met at the door by an employee, later identified as Vadim Sapargueldiev, who
immediately requested her ID. She showed him her Utah Drivers License, a blow-up
of which was admitted as an exhibit at trial. After looking at the ID, Saperguildiev
allowed her into the store, which was restricted to those over eighteen years of age.
(Id. pp. 35-38). After wandering around the store for a couple of minutes, she went
5

to the adult video rack in the far back corner of the store, and approached the desk to
purchase a video (Id.). Shortly thereafter, she saw Haltom come to the counter. (Id
p. 39). She was asked to produce her identification again, and she handed it to
Haltom, who said something to the effect of "we need to check and just make sure"
that she was the person on the license. (Id pp. 39-40). He verified her address, may
have asked for her social security number, and appeared to compare her photo with
her features (Id p. 40, 48). When she answered correctly, as to her address, Haltom
seemed satisfied with her identification and permitted Sapergueldiev to sell her the
video. She then purchased the video and left (Id pp. 40-41). She never looked at the
video, and took it directly to the police station where she handed it over to Detective
Brimley (Id p. 42). She later returned to the store with officer Jarvis, "to identify the
people who had looked at my drivers license." (Id p. 52).
The second witness, Detective Dean Brimley, testified that he was, in the
summer of 2000, the Midvale City Vice Officer (Id pp. 62-63). Late in July of that
year, Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique opened in Midvale. The
merchandise sole in the store included adult videos (Id pp. 63-64). Detective Brimley
went to the store shortly prior to August 1,2000 and purchased a video (Id p. 64). He
testified that he was asked to determine whether minors would have access to similar
6

materials. As a result, he sent a 17 year old boy into the store to attempt to buy an
adult video. According to Detective Brimley "his ID was checked, and he was sent
out of the store, no purchase made." (Id p. 64-66). Given this failure, he searched for
additional minors willing to attempt to make a purchase, and Assistant Chief Pearson
indicated that his daughter Brittany, age 17, would be available (Id p. 66). Detective
Brimley followed her to the store, and then back to the station, where she gave him
a video entitled "Getting Wet, the Last Howl" purchased from the store. (Id pp. 7172).

l

The third witness was Sergeant Ken Jarvis of the Midvale Police Department,
who went to the store after the purchase had been made. Ms. Pearson identified
Haltom as someone who had looked at her license but not as the person who sold her
the video. (Id p . . 141). Sgt. Jarvis indicated to Haltom that an adult video had been
sold to a minor. He described Defendant as shocked at the news. According to
Sergeant Jarvis, "his mouth dropped", and "it appeared the color dropped from his
face". He was "stunned." (Id pp. 145-6). Haltom later identified Sapergueldiev as
the person who first checked Pearson's I.D. and sold her the video (Id p. 144).

1

Haltom does not contest that the video is adult in nature and was not to be sold to anyone
under 18.
7

Haltom was in Utah to set up the new store, including supervising the
remodeling of the building, stocking merchandise, hiring staff, and dealing with the
City and the media concerning the opening (Id pp. 217-220). Haltom and employees
Emily Wright, Teresa Ferrone, and Bonnie Bolton testified that the store had in place
a regular procedure to check identification to keep out minors. (R. 677 pp. 178-179,
182-183,190-195,200-202,212-215,). On atleast one occasion withinaweek of the
incident at issue, the system worked, and a minor was barred from the store. On
August 4th, she entered.2 For whatever reason, Sapergueldiev violated store policy
and allowed her inside (for which he was promptly terminated)(Id. P. 214). It was
only after the first check had inexplicably failed that Defendant became involved, at
the specific request of the employee. Haltom testified that this was not part of his
regular duties with the business, that he was in his office on the second floor at the
time, and that he was specifically called down not to check on age, but to answer a
question on the verification of identity (IdL pp. 220-222). His testimony and that of
Ms. Pearson do not conflict. He concentrated on the identification of Ms. Pearson,
rather than her age. He asked her for personal information from the license, which she

2

Defendant's Exhibit 7, a store promotional video tape shows Saperguildiev checking I.D.'s
at the door; and witnesses Wright, Ferrone and Bolton identified him as being involved in their
training on this point. (R. 677; pp.179, 191, 201, 208. 209.213).
8

was able to produce, and he seemed satisfied, allowing Sapergueldiev to finish selling
her the video (Id pp. 222-228). Clearly, Haltom was doing someone else's job,
something he never did, and looking at a license with which he was not familiar. He
testified that he only did what he was asked to do by his most experienced and trusted
employee and that was to review with the employee hot to detect false I.D. (Id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the applicable standard of
conduct for this crime was simple negligence, a standard usually reserved for civil
cases.

The application of such a standard in a case with First Amendment

implications violates Defendant's rights under the First Amendment. The application
of that standard by the Court of Appeals without notice to Defendant or a chance to
contest it, denies Defendant Due Process of Law under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I Sec. 5 of the
Constitution of Utah.
II. Defendant is not guilty as a matter of law of the crime of dealing in
materials harmful to a minor, as his conduct does not meet the legal standard of
criminal negligence. The uncontroverted evidence is that he was called in to the store
9

by an employee who was charged with checking Identification, and excluding minors.
The employee had a specific question which did not involve the age of the person
attempting to purchase the material. His failure to check age a second time, after a
trusted employee had done it once, is not criminal negligence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A FINDING OF
ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT.
Defendant John Haltom was convicted by a jury trial of dealing in material
harmful to a minor, a violation of § 76-10-1206 U.C. A. The material is an item which
the store held for sale to adults only. There was no evidence that Haltom
intentionally sold an adult movie to a minor. In fact, there is no dispute that he only
got involved in the transaction after another person checked the minor's I.D., and
allowed her into the store. Neither did he actually make the sale. The question
therefore was whether he violated the law in failing to stop the sale to a minor, even
though this was not his direct responsibility. The Court, in accordance with § 76-2103 U.C.A., properly instructed the jury:

10

A person fails to use reasonable care within the meaning of the law when he
acts recklessly. A person acts recklessly when he is aware of, but consciously
disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the results will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor's standpoint.
The standard put to the jury is the same as criminal negligence, or that degree
of negligence necessary to convict Haltom of a serious crime, in this case a Third
Degree Felony. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the lower standard of
simple negligence, normally used in civil cases, applied:
"Reasonable care" is defined as "[t]hat degree of care which a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances, [and
f]ailure to exercise such care is ordinary negligence." Black's Law Dictionary
1265 (6th ed. 1990). Haltom has presented us with no reason to believe that the
legislature intended a different meaning, or with any case law that would
support his position in the face of this language. (Emphasis in original). State
v. Haltom. 2005 UT App. 348, 532 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,120.
The Court of Appeals described the standard of criminal negligence in State v.
Larsen. 2000 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). The Court there
said:
Conduct is not criminally negligent unless it constitutes a 'gross deviation'
from the standard of care exercised by an ordinary person." State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254,267 (Utah 1998). "[Ordinary negligence, which is the basis for
li

a civil action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence."
Id In State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1989), this Court explained,
"[m]ere inattention or mistake in a judgment resulting even in death of another
is not criminal unless the quality of the act makes it so."' IcL at 1207; see 21
Am.Jur. 2d Criminal Law §136 (1998) ("The 'negligence' required in this
context must be more than the lack of ordinary care and precaution; it must be
something more than the mere inadvertence or misadventure, but rather a
recklessness or indifference incompatible with a proper regard for human
life."). Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, f 18.
The defendant in Larsen had been convicted of negligent homicide, a Class A
Misdemeanor, for his failure to yield at an intersection, and turning left in front of
another vehicle. With regard to the defendant's negligence, the Court went on to say:
In this case, defendant's conduct, while apparently negligent, does not rise to
the level of criminal negligence. Defendant's conduct is more accurately
characterized as a serious mistake in judgment. The facts presented at trial do
not indicate that defendant's action were undertaken recklessly or with an
indifference to human life, nor does the quality of defendant's act lead to the
conclusion that his actions were criminal. Rather, defendant simply failed to
see an oncoming car which was visible to other drivers as he made a left turn,
with tragic consequences. Larsen, 2000 Utah App 106, f 21.
The Court of Appeals erred by using the normally civil standard of ordinary or
simple negligence here. The evidence here does not support a finding that Haltom
was reckless and that his conduct constituted "a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise." This is especially true in light of the

12

fact that it was Sapargueldiev who initially reviewed the I.D. and who made the sale
after twice reviewing Pearson's license. Sapergueldiev diverted Haltom's attention
to the validity of the identification of the person, and away from the customer's age.
By asking Haltom to verify the identity and not the date of birth, there certainly was
an implied representation from Sapergueldiev that the customer was of age.3 Haltom
relied on this senior employee and others trained by him to check age, a management
step taken by many business owners around the country every day. Given the fact
that he properly relied on his employees, any mistake in judgment by Haltom did not
rise to the standard of criminal negligence.
The Court of Appeals recently had occasion to revisit their decision in Larsen,
in State v. Boss. 2005 UT App 520 (Utah App., Dec. 8, 2005). In a footnote, the
Court compared reckless behavior with criminal negligence:
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (2003) (stating persons act recklessly
when they are "aware of but consciously disregard a substantial and
unjustifiable risk" (emphasis added)), with id. § 76-2-103(4) (stating that
persons act with criminal negligence when they "ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will

3

Because the regular business practice was to check identification as a customer entered the
store, the fact that Pearson had been admitted at the front door was also evidence that her age had
been verified prior to Sapargueldiev calling Haltom down to review the I.D.
13

occur" (emphasis added)). Criminal negligence, like recklessness, and unlike
ordinary negligence, requires a gross deviation from the applicable standard of
care. See State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (comparing and
contrasting reckless manslaughter with negligent homicide). The risk of death
required for recklessness and for criminally negligent conduct is the same; the
only difference between the two is whether the defendant was aware of that
risk. See id.: see also State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 206 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (describing the distinction between reckless manslaughter and negligent
homicide as whether person perceives risk of death, not degree of perception
of risk). Therefore, despite the Larsen court's reference to recklessness, our
decision in that case was correct, because it hinged upon the court's
determination that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard
of care. See Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 at 127. Id Fn. 2.
The Court, stated "we agree with the State that the 'reckless' and 'indifferent'
language we employed in Larsen is unfortunate and should not be read to substitute
recklessness for the relevant standards set forth in § 76-2-103(4)." (Id.). The Court
explained that the difference between the recklessness referred to in Larsen and
criminal negligence is the degree of awareness of the substantial and unjustifiable
risk. Criminal negligence requires only that a person "ought to be aware" of the
substantial risk. That implied awareness must be accompanied by "a gross deviation
from the standard of care." Under either definition, the conduct of Defendant here is
not sufficient because there was no such gross deviation..
14

In rejecting Haltom's argument, the Court of Appeals cited a case from this
Court, State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376,378-79 (Utah 1983), in which the Court ruled
that the use of the term "negligence" in the automobile homicide statute denoted
simple negligence.

The Court of Appeals in Larsen correctly stated the law:

"[Ojrdinary negligence which is the basis for a civil action for damages, is not
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence." Exceptions to that clear rule should be,
and are, rare. In Hamblin, the simple negligence was not sufficient in itself to convict
of the crime. The statute required a separate deliberate act, driving under the
influence of alcohol, in combination with the negligence; and that certainly is
sufficient to distinguish it here. This case must also be distinguished because of its
First Amendment implications. Selling written or pictorial material which might be
objectionable to some, but which has not been adjudged legally obscene is protected
by both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 15 of
the Constitution of Utah. Therefore, while the sale of such material might cause some
danger that it might be sold to a minor, it is a risk that society must take (with
reasonable safeguards) to encourage the free flow of ideas. This is not the same sort
of danger inherent in drunk driving and cannot be remedied in the same manner. As
15

this Court has stated:
When state action impinges on fundamental rights, due process requires
standards which clearly define the scope of permissible conduct so as to avoid
unwarranted intrusion on those rights. A statute which affects fundamental
liberties is unconstitutional if it is so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning. In re Bover. 636 P.2d 1085, 1087-8
(Utah 1981).
It is the duty of the Court to construe the statute to avoid constitutional
problems if possible. JkL The obvious corollary is that any uncertainty in statutory
terms must be resolved favorably to Haltom.
Just last year, the Florida Supreme Court discussed at some length the
requirement of mens rea in State v. Giorgetti. 868 So.2d 512 (Fla. 2004):
Initially, we would note that the Legislature generally has broad authority to
determine any requirement for intent or knowledge in the definition of a crime.
See Reynolds v. State. 842 So.2d 46,49 (Fla. 2002). To determine whether the
Legislature included a knowledge requirement in any given statute, we first
look to the statute's plain language. Id In the instant case, however, the sexual
offender registration statutes provide no explicit guidance as to whether the
Legislature intended there to be a knowledge requirement for proving a
violation of the statute. See § 943.0435, Fla. Stat. (2000); § 944.607(9), Fla.
Stat. (2000). The statutory provisions dealing with the sexual offender
registration requirements simply contain no express direction.
At common law, all crimes consisted of both an act or omission coupled with
a requisite guilty knowledge or mens rea. See United States v. Balint. 258 U.S.
250, 251, 42 S.Ct. 301, 66 L.Ed. 604 (1922). Hence, as a general rule, guilty
16

knowledge or mens rea was a necessary element in the proof of every crime.
Id, see also United States v. United States Gvpsum Co.. 438 U.S. 422,436,98
S.Ct. 2864, 57 :.Ed.2d 854 (1978) ("The existence of a mens rea is the rule of,
rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence."). Subsequently, as chronicled in numerous U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, this rule was followed with regard to statutorily defined crimes,
even if the statute did not expressly include a knowledge requirement. See
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608
(1994) ("[SJilence . . . does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to
dispense with a conventional mens rea element, which would require that the
defendant knows the facts that make his conduct illegal."). In fact, the United
States Supreme Court "has on a number of occasions read a state-of-mind
component into an offense even when the statutory definition did not in terms
so provide." United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864.
Moreover, because of the strength of the traditional rule that requires mens rea,
offenses that require no mens rea are generally disfavored. Staples, 511 U.S.
at 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793.
Thus the Supreme Court has concluded that "some indication of congressional
intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element
of a crime." Id In other words, the Court has virtually created a presumption
in favor of a guilty knowledge element absent an express provision to the
contrary. Id. at 515
This policy is consistent with the concept that criminal sanctions are ordinarily
reserved for acts of intentional misconduct. Chicone also noted the judicial
policy that "[t]he group of offenses punishable without proof of any criminal
intent must be sharply limited." Id (quoting Francis Bowes Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L.Rev. 55, 70 (1933)). Moreover, as the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted, although the legislature has the broad authority to
define the elements of a crime, the legislature must still "act within any
acceptable constitutional constraints in defining criminal offenses." Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.ed.2d 434
17

(1985).
In Chicone. we relied extensively on Judge Co wart's opinion in State v. Oxx.
417 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In Oxx, Judge Cowart recognized three
possible restraints on the Legislature's power to eliminate scienter
requirements from a statute: (1) statutes that codify common law mala in se or
"infamous" crimes where intent is considered to be so inherent in the concept
of the common law offense that it is deemed included as an element; (2)
statutes that would tend to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights if intent
were not required: and (3) statutes that impose an affirmative duty to act on an
individual and then penalize the failure to act. (Emphasis added) Id. at 516517.
Defendant, who engages in the sale of material protected by the First
Amendment as expression, contends that this statute falls within both the second and
third categories above. Failing to include a scienter requirement would chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights. The Court went on to say:
Because scienter is often necessary to comport with due process requirements,
we ascribe the Legislature with having intended to include such a requirement.
Cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.. 513 U.S. 64, 73, 115 S.Ct. 464,
130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) (noting, in case where intent was read into statute to
avoid constitutionality problems, "we do not impute to Congress an intent to
pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as construed by this
Court"). Id at 518.
See also City of Colorado Springs v. 2354. Inc.. 896 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1995).
The Supreme Court there reviewed an ordinance which allowed the revocation of a
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business license for a sexually oriented business if an employee violated any portion
of the licensing ordinance. The Court stated:
In addition, as the trial court observed, section 8-1-801(D) of the Code is not
narrowly tailored at all. Any violation of any legislative prohibition triggers
mandatory suspension or revocation. Section 8-1-801 of the Code contains no
criteria indicating what circumstances warrant suspension as opposed to
revocation. Such a sweeping regulation, however appropriate in other contexts,
is not narrowly drawn to insure maximum opportunity for constitutionally
protected modes of expression. In view of the danger of censorship and
arbitrary suppression inherent in the application of imprecise standards,
regulations granting government officials excessive discretion to regulate
constitutionally protected modes of expression are unconstitutional on their
face. Knuz v. New York. 340 U.S. 291, 71 S.Ct. 312, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951);
Lovellv. Griffin. 303 U.S. 444,58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938); see Vance
v. Universal Amusement Co.. 445 U.S. 308, 311 n. 3,100 S.Ct. 1156,1159 n.
3, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980). We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the
provisions of section 8-1-801(D) of the Code are invalid as applied to sexually
explicit business licensees. WL at 297.
In United States v. X-Citement Video. Inc.. 513 U.S. 64 (1994) the Court dealt
with the statute which prohibited "knowingly" transporting child pornography in
interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit had held the law facially unconstitutional
because it did not require a similar scienter requirement regarding the age of the
performer. The Supreme Court read into the statute the requirement that the
Defendant also knew of the presence of a minor in such material, even though the
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statute did not directly say so. The Supreme Court said:
A final canon of statutory construction supports the reading that the term
"knowingly" applies to both elements. Cases such as Ferber. 458 U.S. at 765
("as with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without
some element of scienter on the part of the defendant"); Smith v. California.
361 U.S. 147 (1959); Hamling v. United States. 418 U.S. 87 (1974) and
Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103,115 (1990), suggest that a statute completely
bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise
serious constitutional doubts. It is therefore incumbent upon us to read the
statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress. Id at 78.
These cases surely support the contention that, in the area of distribution of
non-obscene and constitutionally protected adult materials, mere negligence in
distributing to a minor is not a constitutionally sound standard. The affirmative duty
which is required here is the duty to take reasonable measures to see that distribution
is not made to minors; and violating that duty requires more than mere negligence.
Under the heading of "Principles of Criminal Responsibility" and the subheading of
"Culpability generally", is § 76-2-102 U.C.A., which sets forth the "culpable mental
state required".

That statute seriously narrows the category of criminal statutes

which do not require "intent, knowledge, or recklessness". That statute requires a
culpable mental state unless a clear intention of the Legislature is expressed to make
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the offense one of strict liability. The very next section of the Code, §76-2-103
U.C. A. includes the definitions necessary to establish criminal intent. Likewise, § 762-104 reiterates the various standards sufficient to convict of specific crimes, and
omits any reference to simple negligence.

The specific statute which Defendant

was accused of violating here uses the word "intentionally" in each of its three
subsections describing the prohibited conduct. Regarding the age of the other person,
the statute requires either knowledge or the failure "to exercise reasonable care".
While this obviously includes a lower standard than that of knowledge, it is error to
read it as simple negligence, for the same reasons set out in X-Citement Video.
The crime of which Defendant stands convicted is not an infraction or minor
misdemeanor. It is a felony, punishable by up to five years in the Utah State Prison.
Admittedly, the sentence of the Court did not include such a prison term, though
Defendant has already served 30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. The conviction
of a felony is a serious consequence. Defendant has long been a hunter, and is now
precluded from purchasing a firearm for use in such an activity. He is now a resident
of the State of Nebraska, which has a disability provision in its voting law for
convicted felons. Defendant remains on probation, which always carries the
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possibility of additional jail time for unrelated violations, such as a failure to report.
With such serious consequences, a simple negligence standard cannot be appropriate.
The Principles of "Criminal Responsibility" at the beginning of the Utah Criminal
Code, is a road map for interpreting the rest of the Code. The State apparently makes
the belated argument for a lower standard of responsibility because of the lack of
strong

support for its original contention that Defendant did act, under the

circumstances, with criminal negligence. The definition of criminal negligence
specifically requires the finder of fact to look to "all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint." Those circumstances and that standpoint should take
into account the presence of Sapergeldiev, the corporation's senior employee
specifically charged with the business of screening customers for age. With that
circumstance in mind, Defendant's conduct does not, as a matter of law, constitute
criminal negligence.
The Court of Appeals faulted Haltom for presenting "no reason to believe that
the legislature intended a different meaning, or with any case law which would
support his position in the face of this language." Haltom believes he did exactly that
in citing Larsen. But the Court of Appeals erred in putting this burden on Haltom in
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the first place. The trial court agreed with Haltom as to the standard of negligence
required and gave a jury instruction which supported that standard. It did so without
objection from the State. Given that the issue was settled before the trial court,
Haltom had no notice of the need the matter in detail to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals previously ruled that an argument not made before the
trial court is waived on appeal, unless there is "plain error. " See State v. Smit. 95
P.3d 1203, 2004 UT App 222, f 28 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("To demonstrate plain
error, 'a defendant has the burden of showing '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and(iii) the error is harmful.'"). Since the
first and third points above apply to virtually all appeals, the focus of "plain error"
review is that the error should have been obvious to the trial judge. In its Brief to the
Court of Appeals, the State referred to the alleged error of the trial court in giving its
jury instruction, only in passing, (Appellee's Br. 19-20), and it did not argue plain
error or cite any case law which clearly showed the error. This Court observes the
same standards for "plain error" review. See State v. Cruz. 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30,
2005 UT 45, f 18 n.2 (Utah 2005). In this regard, this Court cited with approval the
additional Federal requirement that the error must "seriously affect the fairness,
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integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id Certainly, the State cannot
claim any such thing here, as the jury found the level of criminal negligence
necessary to convict Haltom. Either the State must have shown that the jury was
correct; or Haltom must have been put on notice that serious defense of the trial
court's ruling on this point is expected. The Court of Appeals ruled that Haltom did
not effectively defend the trial court's negligence standard even though there was no
reason to believe that this standard was in contention. Certainly, this cannot be the
law, as such a ruling would violate Defendant's right to Due Process of Law..
Only at oral arguments did the State forcefully argue that the trial court's
standard was incorrect, and even then, there was no citation of controlling authority.
It should be noted in this context that the legislature acted to clarify the standard of
negligence in this particular crime, while the matter was under advisement in the
Court of Appeals. The 2004 legislature, in House Bill 260, changed the law to
require "having negligently or recklessly failed to determine the proper age of a
minor." Both sides filed Supplemental Authority letters claiming that this enhanced
their position. Haltom emphasized the term "recklessly" and claimed that this was
the dominant theme in the amended law. The State claimed that it was now even
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more clear that the standard was simple negligence. When read in conjunction with
the requirement of recklessness, Defendant contends that the 2004 legislature was
clarifying that the standard of negligence was criminal. That decision, of course, is
not currently before this Court. In reading the statutory change, however, however,
two things are clear: first, that any relaxation of the standard would not apply to this
defendant; and second, that the legislature seemed to believe the standard unclear,
and that a clarification was necessary. If so, Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of any
doubt as to the standard at the time of the incident.
In a footnote to this case, regarding the standard of negligence required, the
Court of Appeals said:
The trial court's instruction forced the State to meet a higher mens rea standard
than required under the statute, and because the principles underlying "simple
negligence" are incorporated within the definition of recklessness, the jury
must have, by necessity, found Haltom also to be negligent when they
determined that he had been reckless. Cf. Utah code Ann. § 76-2-104 (2003).
Therefore, although the trial court erred in instructing the jury, the error could
not have prejudiced Haltom and was thus harmless. 2005 UT App 348, f 21
n.5.
That statement apparently was made without much thought as to the
consequences. Haltom was never put on notice that he was litigating a tort case

25

where civil principles were involved. If Haltom had known this, of course, his
counsel would have asked for additional instructions on

proximate cause,

contributory negligence, comparative negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and possibly other
tort doctrines. More importantly, he could have shown that the negligence of
Sapergueldiev was the proximate cause of the sale.4 If simple negligence is the
standard, it becomes obvious who should be held liable. Petitioner introduced
testimony tending to show that Sapergueldiev knew ahead of time about the attempt
to get a minor into the store to purchase an adult video (Testimony of Curtis Gorman,
R. 677 pp. 264-286). Whether or not that is true, we do know that Sapergueldiev
failed in his duty (one that he had performed many times before), that he personally
involved Haltom in a situation that he had been delegated to handle, and that he
diverted Haltom's attention from the issue of age. His negligence was obviously
substantially more than that of Haltom and was the primary cause of the illegal sale.
The law may impose a duty of care to the public at large, on all those who participate
in selling adult videos, but the primary duty of care in this case belonged to

4

It has never been answered satisfactorily why Sapergueldiev was not charged with a crime
arising out of this incident.
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Sapergueldiev. This Court stated the rule in Feree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989):
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff must first establish a
duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Duty is a "question of
whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a particular
plaintiff. .. ." The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law
to be determined by the court.
The duty of Sapergueldiev to his employer is without question. Failure to do
his regular and routine job of excluding minors from obtaining access to adult videos
(and from even entering the store) could be catastrophic to his employer (and was so
here). Compounding the problem by asking his boss to get personally involved in
floor work where he normally did not go, and then distracting his attention from the
issue of age, was all negligent. Having no knowledge of the standard which would
be imposed later by the Court of Appeals, Haltom was unable to present the question
to the jury of whose negligence was the "proximate cause" of the injury. While the
tort doctrine of respondent superior might impose vicarious civil liability on the
corporate employer, it certainly does not impose criminal liability on Haltom.
Imposing criminal liability on a supervisor or employer for the acts of another
also violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process of Law requirement. Attached as
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Appendix B is a copy of the unpublished case of Lee v. City of Newport. No. 915158, 1991 WL 227750 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1991). In that case, the City attempted to
revoke a business license of an adult entertainment establishment, based on criminal
convictions of two employees for prostitution, occurring on the same occasion. The
evidence showed that the management of the establishment was unaware of such
conduct and that immediate measures were taken to protect against any repetition of
it. This situation is essentially similar, as the supervisor (Haltom) is being punished
for acts primarily committed by the employee (Sapergueldiev), which had never
occurred before, and of which he was unaware. That essentially vicarious liability
violates Haltom's right to Due Process.
Section 32A-1-301 U.C.A. et seq. provides that proof of age must be requested
by those selling alcoholic beverages. Violation of that law is only a Class B
misdemeanor (§ 32A-1-305 U.C.A.). Nevertheless, § 32A-1-304(3) U.C.A. relieves
a person of liability if he "acted in good faith" in examining proof of age and
attempting to prevent an unlawful sale. While there is no similar statutory provision
in relationship to adult media, clearly Due Process and the First Amendment requires
the Court to construe the instant statute to include such a requirement. The inclusion
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of the word "intentionally" three times in the subject statute supports a similar
requirement. The State did not meet its burden of proof in this regard, and Haltom's
conviction should be reversed.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT,
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Regarding a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict, this
Court has held:
To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict, the
one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789,799
(Utah 1991).
The Court of Appeals, in West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d
1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) went a step further by saying that the Defendant "must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial [that] supports the very findings [it] resists."
Appellate courts, in their discussion of insufficient evidence, have repeatedly
held that it is the j ob of the Defendant to attack the sufficiency of Plaintiff s evidence,
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not set forth their own contradictory evidence. This is a crime, however, involving
criminal negligence. The existence of a system reasonably calculated to avoid the
unlawful results, is a defense.
The State, in its Brief below, suggested that Defendant did not properly
marshal the evidence in this case, as required by several Utah cases, including State
v. Martinez. 2002 UT App 126,47 P.3d 1115 (Utah App. 2002). Defendant did, in
fact, carefully set forth the evidence introduced against Defendant by Plaintiffs, and
avoided the trap of weighing such evidence against that introduced by Defendant.
The State appeared to later admit that fact, on page 16 of its Brief, when it stated "a
brief summary of the marshaled facts and their reasonable inferences establishes that
Defendant recklessly failed to ascertain Brittany's age before selling her an adult
video". The State thus listed all of the evidence that Defendant did marshal, asserting
that it was sufficient to establish Defendant's guilt. The State did not actually assert
that Defendant left out any relevant evidence that would be necessary to the
marshaling requirement. Therefore, the State's argument that the marshaling
requirement was not met, is without merit.
The existence of a system reasonably calculated to avoid unlawful results is a
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defense to negligence, most certainly to criminal negligence. The evidence was
uncontradicted that Doctor John's did have in place such a system. Several people
testified that an employee was always assigned to the door area, and that the primary
duty of that employee was to check identification and keep out minors. It worked the
first time that Midvale Police attempted to get a minor into the store. Sapergueldiev,
was not new at this responsibility. He was featured on a video tape, produced by
Doctor John's store in Nebraska before the Midvale store opened, demonstrating the
procedure. Part of the reason he was in Utah was for the purpose of training new
employees on avoiding just this problem. (R. 677 p. 219). He had been responsible
for training employees in Nebraska, including witness Bonnie Bolton, one of
Haltom's senior employees. (IcL p. 201). Haltom was in his office upstairs at the
time of the incident and was only called down by Sapergueldiev because of his
expressed concern that perhaps Ms. Pearson might not be the person in the
photograph. (Id pp. 222-223). Given the existence of the system as described by
the several witnesses, Haltom felt justified in assuming that the date of birth had been
checked. His went only for further verification of the identification of the woman. He
checked her address, he checked her social security number, and he compared facial
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features. (Id pp. 224-227). After doing so, he told Sapergueldiev that he was
satisfied that she was the person pictured on the driver license. According to Haltom,
he even lost his temper a bit with Sapergueldiev, who once again asked whether he
was permitted to make the sale. "I kinda got a little frustrated and then I - 1 said,
'What's the problem? It's her ID.'or something to that effect." (Id p. 226). Haltom
was only implicated because he had gone the extra mile to prevent someone using
a false I.D. to unlawfully purchase an adult item. If he had stayed up in his office and
told the employee, "you are experienced enough, I trust your judgment," he would not
have been implicated. Haltom's personal involvement in this incident does not
support the charge. To the contrary, it shows an additional attempt to avoid a
problem. In fact, Haltom is in the same position as the defendant in Larsen. who
missed seeing something that was plainly visible. In this case, it simply was not what
he was looking for, as Ms. Pearson had already been checked for age.
Utah driver licenses are designed to preclude underage persons from
purchasing alcohol. With that in mind, the words "minor" (meaning under 21) and
a separate statement "under 21" are featured prominently on the license. (St. Ex. 1).
The date of birth is less prominent, and it was not Haltom's regular responsibility to
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investigate the license in this regard. To find that the evidence against Haltom is
sufficient to sustain this charge necessitates a finding that the regular efforts by
Haltom's employees to screen customers as to age were not reasonably calculated to
achieve that goal. The evidence is to the contrary, and this clearly is an isolated
instance. He cannot be expected to personally double-check every customer who
comes into one of the numerous stores, even when he happens to be on the premises.
The fact that he attempted to help out with a particular question on this occasion does
not impose such a duty; and the duty was thus not violated. The evidence, as a matter
of law, does not rise to the standard required by the appellate courts of the State of
Utah.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals erred when it lowered the standard of negligence applied
to the conduct of Defendant, to that of simple negligence. It is in conflict with its
previous decision in Larsen: and it violates Defendant's rights under the First
Amendment and to Due Process of Law. It did so without notice to Haltom or the
opportunity to contest it.
The evidence produced by Plaintiff is not sufficient as a matter of law to
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convict Defendant of the crime charged, that of dealing in material harmful to a
minor. The evidence does not meet the required minimum for a finding of criminal
negligence, the state of mind required for this conviction.
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THORNE, Judge:
^II John Vonderhaar Haltom appeals his conviction for dealing in
material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
f2
On August 4, 2000, just a few days after Dr. John's Lingerie
and Novelty store (Dr. John's) opened for business, police in
Midvale, Utah, sent BP, a seventeen-year-old girl, into the store
to attempt to buy an adult film. She entered the store and was
soon thereafter approached by Vadim Saprgeuldiev (Vadim), who
asked to see her identification. BP gave Vadim, who was an
employee of Dr. John's but not actually on duty when BP entered,
her driver license. He glanced at it and then gave it back and
permitted her to shop. After wandering around the store for a
few minutes, BP went to the adult video rack where she chose one
at random and then went to the counter to make the purchase. As
she shopped, Vadim called Haltom, a part owner of Dr. John's, to
the counter and asked him how one could determine whether a
license was authentic. Haltom informed Vadim that if BP

attempted to purchase an adult video, he would show him. As BP
approached the counter, Haltom asked her for her identification
and she again produced her driver license.
H3
Haltom took the license and examined it. Among the relevant
information contained on the license were BP's photo, name,
address, social security number, and her date of birth, which
clearly showed that BP was born in December 1982 and was
therefore just seventeen years old at the time. Haltom carefully
compared BP to the photo and then asked her to recite her social
security number--printed next to her date of birth--and her
address. When she gave an address with a street name rather than
coordinates, Haltom became concerned and asked her to clarify her
answer. She responded with the proper coordinate address, which
corresponded with the address on the license, and Haltom handed
back the license. Vadim then asked Haltom if he could sell the
video to BP and Haltom answered "What's the problem? It's her
I.D. [and] she's eighteen, right?" Vadim completed the sale as
Haltom was talking with BP and she left the store.
f4
Soon thereafter, BP returned to the store with Detective
Brimley, the Midvale City Police officer who had sent her into
Dr. John's. Brimley informed Haltom that he had sold an adult
video to a minor--BP--and BP identified Vadim and Haltom as the
people she had dealt with during the transaction. Haltom was
arrested for dealing with material harmful to a minor, in
violation of Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000) .
1(5
Prior to trial, Haltom petitioned to have the charges
dismissed because, he argued, he had been entrapped as a matter
of law. The State responded and a hearing was scheduled, during
which Haltom presented just one witness--Curtis Gorman, a former
employee who had been fired for stealing from Haltom and who had
been referred to the Midvale Police Department by Haltom for that
theft. Haltom argued that Brimley had established a relationship
with Vadim, and that Brimley had used Vadim as a police agent to
induce Haltom to sell the video to BP. Through Gorman's
testimony, Haltom introduced evidence that Brimley was interested
in subverting a Dr. John's employee, and that, at Brimley's
urging, Gorman had talked with Vadim about meeting with Brimley.
But, Gorman never again met with Brimley and he had no idea
whether Brimley had been able to talk with Vadim, or if, assuming
such an encounter occurred, Vadim had agreed to work with
Brimley. Consequently, the trial court denied Haltom 1 s motion,
but informed all parties that Haltom would be given the
opportunity to present his entrapment claim to the jury as a
factual defense to the charge.
^6
The case was subsequently tried in front of a jury, which
convicted Haltom. Haltom filed a post-trial motion to arrest the
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judgment, which the trial court denied, and he was sentenced to a
statutory term of imprisonment of zero to five years in prison.
The trial court, however, suspended all but thirty days of that
time and placed Haltom on probation. Haltom now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1
1(7 Haltom argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
he had not been entrapped as a matter of law. The trial court's
decision presents a mixed question of fact and law. See State v.
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Although we review
factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for
correctness, due to the factually sensitive nature of entrapment
cases we will affirm the trial court's decision "unless we can
hold, based on the given facts, that reasonable minds cannot
differ as to whether entrapment occurred." Id. Only when
reasonable minds could not differ can we find entrapment as a
matter of law. See id.
%B Haltom next argues that the trial court erred in concluding
that certain testimony was inadmissible hearsay. "Whether a
^Although on appeal Haltom argues that his due process
rights were violated when Brimley erased the audio tape made
during his interview with Gorman, he failed to preserve this
argument below. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63,^13, 95 P.3d 276
(stating "appellate courts will not consider an issue, including
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves
exceptional circumstances"); see also State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,
7-8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Had Haltom preserved this issue "[t]he
materiality required to reverse a criminal conviction for . . .
destruction of evidence as a denial of due process is more than
evidentiary materiality." State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363
(Utah 1983) . "The evidence must be material in a constitutional
sense." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 926 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) . To meet this threshold, Haltom must show that the
"'evidence is vital to the issues of whether [he] is guilty of
the charge and whether there is a fundamental unfairness that
requires the Court to set aside [his] conviction.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)). Haltom does not
meaningfully assert that anything on the destroyed tape satisfies
this burden, and in fact, Gorman's version of the taped interview
largely agreed with Brimley's version. Thus, it is questionable
whether Haltom would have been able to demonstrate harm resulting
from the destruction of the tape. Nevertheless, because he
failed to preserve this issue in the trial court, we will not
address the substance of the argument here.
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statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a
question of law, which we review under a correction of error
standard." State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
19
Haltom also argues that the trial court's decision on the
relevance of certain statutory changes to the format of minors 1
driver licenses was incorrect. "While relevant evidence is
generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will
find error . . . only if the trial court has abused its
discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (citation omitted).
HlO Finally, Haltom argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction both as a matter of law and of fact.
Haltom's argument falls into two categories. First, he asserts
that his activities did not constitute a violation of section 7610-1206 as a matter of law, which under these circumstances
presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review
for correctness. See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1137, 52 P.3d
1210. Second, he asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to
support the jury's verdict. "[W]hen reviewing a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict." State v. Warden, 813 P.2d
1146, 1150 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS
^[11 Haltom first argues that the trial court erred in failing to
dismiss the complaint because he was entrapped as a matter of
law. "Utah has never recognized a per se rule of entrapment."
State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Instead,
Utah has adopted an objective standard through which all
entrapment claims will be examined, with the focus on whether the
police conduct created "a substantial risk that a normal lawabiding person would be induced to commit a crime." State v.
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State
v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979) (stating that the
objective view asks whether "the conduct of the government
comport[s] with a fair and honorable administration of justice").
Under an objective standard, law enforcement officials are not
denied the use of decoys. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500. Nor are
police prohibited from using people that a defendant might
consider to be a friend. See Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707 (stating
"the mere existence of a personal relationship does not establish
entrapment"). Instead, the focus of our objective test is on
examining whether the government conduct created or manufactured
a crime. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500-01 ("Nothing can be more
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reprehensible than to induce the commission of crime for the
purpose of apprehending and convicting the perpetrator."
(quotations and citation omitted)). Consequently, to determine
whether an entrapment has occurred fact finders are required to
examine whether law officers, or their agents, induced "the
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence . . . by
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." Beddoes, 890
P.2d at 3 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations
omitted).
1l2 Haltom argues that he would not have sold an adult video to
a minor in the absence of Vadim's alleged relationship with
Brimley. However, at best, the evidence Haltom offered in
support of this assertion is subject to multiple interpretations,
ranging from the one offered by Haltom--that Vadim became an
agent of the State--to the one offered by the State--that Vadim
did nothing to assist Brimley's crusade against Dr. John's.
Moreover, had the evidence of Vadim's relationship with the State
been less tenuous, this alone is still insufficient to establish
entrapment as a matter of law. See id. (noting that exploitation
of a relationship is a necessary factor to meet the requirements
of entrapment). This is especially true given Haltom's decision
to ask BP for her identification and examine it. Once he did
this, there is no evidence that Vadim attempted to coerce or
convince Haltom to ignore her date of birth, or that Vadim told
Haltom that he had already checked the birthdate and that there
was no need to do so again. Rather than an issue that could be
settled as a matter of law, Haltom presented the trial court with
evidence that could have supported Haltom's entrapment defense,
but that also could have been interpreted as insignificant.
Consequently, because reasonable minds easily could differ on the
question of entrapment as a matter of law in this case, the trial
court properly denied Haltom's motion.2 See id.
i|l3 Haltom next argues that the trial court erred in suppressing
a portion of Theresa Ferrone's testimony as inadmissible hearsay.
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant . . ., offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R.
Evid. 801(c). "'[I]f an out-of-court statement is "offered
simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it
was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay
rule."!n In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993)). "To the
extent that there is no factual dispute, whether a statement is
2

Haltom presents no challenge to the jury's refusal to
accept his entrapment defense as a matter of fact.

20040031-CA

5

offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a question of
law, which we review under a correction of error standard." Id.
(quotations, citation, and alteration omitted).
Hl4 Haltom argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
he was offering Ferrone's testimony concerning a conversation
with Vadim for the truth of the matter asserted. Specifically,
Haltom suggests that Ferrone's testimony was offered to bolster
Haltom's claim that Vadim was an expert in the store's policies
and accepted methods for identifying and excluding minors from
the premises. Assuming that Haltom's version of the testimony is
correct, we do not believe that the statements were offered for
the truth of the matter asserted.3 In fact, the excluded
statement would have done nothing more than support Haltom's
claim that Vadim was the store trainer and that he was quite
aware of the store policy concerning the admission of minors.
1|l5 However, the trial court's erroneous exclusion of Vadim's
statements does not necessarily require the reversal of Haltom's
conviction. "' [W]e do not upset the verdict of a jury merely
because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will do
so only if it is something substantial and prejudicial in the
sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence
there would have been a different result.'" State v. Hutchison,
655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) (quoting State v. Urias, 609 P.2d
1326, 1329 (Utah 1980)). "Where evidence is excluded by the
trial court and the substance of such evidence is later admitted
through some other means, any error which may have resulted is
cured." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8,1(29, 994 P.2d 177. Here,
although the trial court disallowed Haltom's attempt to use
Vadim's own words to support Haltom's assertion that Vadim knew
the store policy well enough to train others, Haltom was able to
present other evidence of Vadim's role as Dr. John's trainer.
For instance, Haltom's long-time employee Bonnie Bolton testified
that she was trained by Vadim on how to "card" potential patrons
to ensure that they were not minors. During Haltom's testimony,
he identified Vadim as "a senior employee," one sufficiently
experienced to appear in the background of a Dr. John's
promotional video carding potential customers. He further
testified that he brought Vadim in from Nebraska to train the
Utah employees and that Vadim was a trusted employee. Thus,
3

During her direct examination, Ferrone was asked if Vadim
had provided her with any instruction or training in addition to
that provided by Haltom. She responded "Vadim just told me, you
know, you need to check every I.D. . . . " a t which point the
State objected. The court sustained the objection. The State
offered no reason for its objection, but the court informed
Haltom that "[a]ny hearsay is off."
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although the jury was not presented with Vadim's statements,
ample evidence of Vadim's knowledge was presented to the jury
through other avenues. Thus, even though the trial court erred
in suppressing the statement, the error was not harmful. See,
e.g., State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 697-98 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (concluding that trial court's error was harmless because
sufficient similar evidence was presented to the jury to render
the error harmless).
Kl6 Haltom also argues that the trial court erred in denying his
attempt to introduce subsequent legislative changes to the format
of driver licenses for minors. "While relevant evidence is
generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will
find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has
abused its discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401; see also Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at
127.
1l7 The trial court in this instance did not exceed the
permitted range of its discretion. Haltom's defense was never
predicated on a claim that he was unfamiliar with the format of
Utah's driver licenses, or that he was confused by BP's
identification in particular. Instead, his defense centered
entirely upon his reliance on Dr. John's policy of precluding
minors from the premises, his expectation that his employees
would not fail in enforcing the policy, and his claim that the
Midvale police used Vadim to entrap Haltom. The subsequent
legislative changes to the driver license format were irrelevant
to the defenses offered by Haltom, and therefore we conclude that
the trial court acted well within its permitted range of
discretion in refusing to allow Haltom to introduce evidence of
the changes.
i|l8 Haltom's final and most forceful argument is that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of
dealing in materials harmful to a minor. More concisely, Haltom
asserts that the State failed to prove that he violated the
statute when he sold the video to BP. To address Haltom's
challenge properly, we must first determine the culpable mental
state required to violate section 76-10-1206. Only after doing
so can we examine the merits of his argument.
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Section 76-10-1206 states:
A person is guilty of dealing in material
harmful to minors when, knowing that a person
is a minor, or having failed to exercise
reasonable care in ascertaining the proper
age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers
to distribute; exhibits or offers to
exhibit to a minor any material harmful
to minors.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003) (emphasis added).
"When
interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002
UT 80, 1J8, 52 P.3d 1276 (quotations and citations omitted). "To
discover^that intent, we look first to the plain language of the
statute." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1(34, 52 P.3d 1210
(quotations and citation omitted). "When examining the statutory
language we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and
in accordance with its ordinary meaning." Martinez, 2002 UT 80
at %8.
"[T]hus, the statutory words are read literally, unless
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Bluff,
2002 UT 66 at ^34 (quotations and citation omitted).
"Furthermore, we 'avoid interpretations that will render portions
of a statute superfluous or inoperative.1" Martinez, 2002 UT 80
at 18 (quoting Hall v. State Pepf t of Corr., 2001 UT 34,1(15, 24
P.3d 958).
1(2 0 At issue in the instant case is the meaning of the phrase
"having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the
proper age." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (emphasis added). 4
"Reasonable care" is defined as "[t]hat degree of care which a
person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the same or similar
circumstances, [and f]ailure to exercise such care is ordinary
negligence." Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990). Haltom
has presented us with no reason to believe that the legislature
intended a different meaning, or with any case law that would
support his position in the face of this language. Compare State
v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378-79 (Utah 1983) (concluding that the
legislature's use of the term "negligence" warranted a conclusion
4

The statute also creates liability for selling "harmful
material" to someone the seller knows to be a minor. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003). However, Haltom is not, and
has never been, accused of actually knowing that BP was a minor
at the time of the sale. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to
Haltom*s failure to determine BP's age and whether that failure
violated the statute.
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that the elements of automobile homicide were met if the state
could show that the defendant had been simply negligence, and not
criminally negligent), with State v. Larson, 2000 UT 106,1(17-18,
999 P.2d 1252 (noting that the legislature intended criminal
negligence to be the applicable mens rea for negligent homicide
when it used the term "criminal negligence" in the statute).
Although section 76-12-1206 uses neither of the terms "simple
negligence" or "ordinary negligence," it does contain the phrase
"reasonable care." "Reasonable care" carries with it a commonly
accepted definition, and thus, we are bound by its meaning.
Consequently, we conclude that a person violates section 76-101206 if they act with simple or ordinary negligence in failing to
discover that the recipient of "harmful material" is a minor,
prior to providing the material.
f21 Having determined the simple negligence is sufficient to
violate section 76-10-1206, we turn our attention to examining
whether the evidence here was sufficient to support Haltom's
conviction.5 "In making the determination as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate court
does not sit as a second fact finder." State v. Warden, 813 P.2d
1146, 1150 (Utah 1991).
"[W]hen reviewing a claim of
insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all inferences
that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict." Id.
f22 The jury was presented with evidence that BP entered Dr.
John's, that she selected an adult video, and that she took it to
the counter. There, Haltom asked her for her identification
after Vadim called him over and asked him to demonstrate how to
confirm the authenticity of a person's identification. BP gave
Haltom her driver license, and Haltom compared the picture on the
5

Although Haltom's conviction was based on the jury's
finding that he was reckless when he sold the video, this error
is not fatal to his conviction. See State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1,
3 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]e may not interfere with a jury
verdict unless upon review of the entire record, there emerges
error of sufficient gravity to indicate that a defendant's rights
were prejudiced in a substantial manner." (quotations and
citation omitted)). The trial court's instruction forced the
State to meet a higher mens rea standard than required under the
statute, and because the principles underlying "simple
negligence" are incorporated within the definition of
recklessness, the jury must have, by necessity, found Haltom also
to be negligent when they determined that he had been reckless.
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-104 (2003). Therefore, although the
trial court erred in instructing the jury, the error could not
have prejudiced Haltom and was thus harmless.
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license to BP. Satisfied that the picture was indeed of BP, he
asked her to confirm virtually every piece of material
information on the license, including her address and social
security number, but oddly not her date of birth. BP answered
all of his questions, but Haltom became suspicious when the
address she provided did not match the street address on the
license. However, when questioned further, she provided an
equivalent coordinate address that was identical to the one on
the license. Satisfied that the identification was hers, Haltom
instructed Vadim to sell BP the video.
1(23 Examining all of these facts, and the inferences that can be
drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
we conclude that, as a factual matter, the evidence was
sufficient. Haltom held the license and examined it to ensure
that it was authentic. He read every line material to ensuring
the authenticity except the date of birth. Thus we cannot say
that the jury's decision that Haltom's behavior did not
constitute "reasonable care" is unsupported.
^[24 Haltom responds that the defense he presented eliminated any
possible negligence finding as a matter of law. We disagree. At
trial Haltom argued that it was, and is, Dr. John's policy to
exclude from the store everyone under the age of eighteen. Under
the policy, every patron's identification was checked at the
door, so he argues that it was reasonable for him to assume that
she was over eighteen when she reached the counter. The State
countered that in the few days that the store was operating in
Midvale before Haltom's arrest, the officer who eventually
arrested Haltom had twice entered the store without being
subjected to the "mandatory" identification check. The State
also pointed to BP's presence in the store as evidence that Dr.
John's policy was at best sporadically enforced. Thus, the jury
was presented with conflicting information concerning Dr. John's
policy, and it was left to determine whether the policy alone
amounted to "[t]hat degree of care which a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances."
Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990).
^25 Even accepting Haltom's argument that a policy could be used
to immunize him from prosecution--which is a position we do not
necessarily accept--the evidence concerning the application of
this policy was conflicting. Consequently, it was the role of
the jury to determine whether the policy, and Haltom's claimed
reliance upon it, amounted to the reasonable care required by
section 76-10-1206. Cf. Little Am. Ref. Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d
112, 114 (Utah 1982) ("The jury is entrusted to resolve all
relevant questions of fact presented to the court. The questions
of fact include findings of negligence [.]") . The jury determined
that Haltom had been reckless, and by implication that he had
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violated section 76-10-1206's duty of reasonable care, when he
sold the video to BP. Consequently, we conclude that Haltom's
conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.
CONCLUSION
1|26 The trial court properly denied Haltom's motion to dismiss
the charges because Haltom failed to show that he had been
entrapped as a matter of law. The court erred in denying Haltom
the opportunity to introduce testimony concerning Vadim's out of
court statements, but Haltom was given the opportunity to present
evidence to the jury that was sufficiently similar to the
excluded testimony rendering the trial court's error harmless.
Finally, a showing of simple negligence is sufficient to support
a conviction under section 76-10-1206's expectation of
"reasonable care." The jury found that Haltom failed to use
reasonable care in selling an adult video to BP and the evidence
supports its verdict.
%21 Accordingly, we affirm Haltom's conviction.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1f2 8

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge
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ADDENDUM B

Copr. * West 2001 No Claim to Orig. "J.S* Govt. Worts
947 F.2d 945 (Table)
Dnpublished Disposition
(Cite ajs: 947 F.2d $45,

1991 W, 2277500 {{6th Cir.(Ky>)))

NOTICE:
OPINION.

UNPUBLISHED

THIS

IS

AN

rights action pursuant to 42 U-S-C.
§ 1983 is the constitutionality of
certain provisions of an ordinance
enacted by the City of Newport;
Kentucky, Ordinance No. 26-39.
This ordinance purports to be an
occupational
licensing
provision
under which the plaintiff's license
to
operate
an
entertainment
establishment known as the Brass
Bull in Newport was suspended and
conditionally
revoked.
The
plaintiff sought injunctive relief
in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, which
denied
the
application
for
injunctive
relief
following
a
hearing.
The plaintiff has
appealed and for the reasons stated
below this Court reverses the
judgment of the District Court.

(The Court's decision is referenced
in a "Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions* appearing in the
Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule
26 %and Kt CTA6 IOP 206 for rules
regarding
the
citation
of
unpub 1 i she d op ini ons r )
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Armina LEE, d/b/a Brass Bull,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v«
The CITY OP NEWPORT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees •
No. 91-5158*

I. FACTS

Nov. 5, 1931.

A hearing on the plaintiff1 s
application for injunctive relief
was held in the Eastern District of
Kentucky on January 31, 1991. Most
of
the facts
surrounding the
suspension
cf
the
plaintiff's
occupational
license
are not
disputed, [FKriJ
The ordinance at

On Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, No. 91-00613;
Bertilswan, D,J,
E.D.Ky.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

issue,

section 25-39, provides in

relevant part:

Before MILBURN and SUHRHEINRICH,
Circuit Judges, and JORDAN, District
"trudgen—mr*1

"-f-ai—:ftny—rrcens-e~^s-su^d--i^nTJeir^rirsdi vis ion may, with notice to the
holder thereof and a hearing as
hereinafter provided for, be revoked
or suspended by the Board of
Commissioners.

LEOlvJ JGRDAN, District Judge.
**1 This is an appeal from the
judgment of the United
States
District Court for the Eastern
District
of Kentucky.
The
determinative issue in this civil

(1) If, within twelve months prior
to the date on which charges are

1

filed, there nas been a conviction
of any licensee or his agent,
servants
or employees, for any
action or activity occurring in, on,
or at the premises covered by the
license,
in
violation
of
any
provision of this division or any
other division of the City cf
Newport, or of any criminal cr penal
statute of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky
against
gambling,
disorderly conduct, cr any other
criminal or penal offense, and a
judgment of conviction in any court
of competent jurisdiction shall be
conclusive
evidence
of
such
violation....
11

(b) ... Upon a decision ay the
Board of Commissioners to revoke or
suspend a license issued under this
division, all business activity at
that
location
shall
cease
immediately
for
the
period of
suspension
or
revocation. 8
(Emphasis added-) [FW2]
The plaintiff is the owner and
operator of the Brass Bull, an adult
oriented nightclub.
she has
operated
the
nightclub
since
September, 1984, and has been issued
an occupational license for every
year of operation;
the last such
license was issued in July, 1990.
Ms: Lee testified that at the time
of the last license renewal, she was
aware that two of her employees had
he^n
convicted
of
acts
of
prostitution,
one
of
whom
was
convicted twice, that occurred on
the premises of the Brass Bull.
Prior1 X7rTKH~XSlIeirai' 7^heY"^TreTO?eT'
one of these employees nad
bzan
terminated by the plaintiff and the
other had left her job voluntarily.
As of July 1, 1S90, the plaintiff
was not offering nude dancing at her
club, since she had her liquor
license at that time, but was
offering seminude dancing,
J.A.

57-59.
**2 On October 25, 1990, the City
of Newport 'the City) issued the
plaintiff a notice to revoke her
license.
This notice was/ received
oy her in early November.
Prior to
the issuance of the notice, the
plaintiff decided tc offer nude
dancing as entertainment and thus
surrendered her liquor license to
the City and the State of Kentucky.
J.A. 16, 55-61.
The City's notice of revocation was
based on the three convictions of
two employees for prostitution in
May, 1990.
The plaintiff's
uncontradicted testimony was that
she was not aware of prostitution cr
solicitation
occurring
on
the
premises cf the Brass Bull prior to
these convictions.
She hae all her
employees sign a contract in which
they are notified that prostitution
will not be permitted
on the
premises.
She stated that she
neither condones nor encourages such
conduct and that any employee who rs
found engaging in this conduct is
fired immediately.
She holds
weekly meetings with ner employees
as part of her efforts to oversee
their activities.
She assigns
other employees to supervise the
employees and has instructed them as
to how such conduct is to be
handled.
These precautions had
been used by her since at least
April, 1990.
The plaintiff stated
m her testimony at the hearing on
her
application
for
injunctive
^rei-iref~tiTat~try-" o^fi^ing~mrde~ddJicaTi^
she was better able to prevent
prostitution since she removed the
booths from the club, turned up the
lighting, eliminated the sale of
alcohol, and prohibited ail contact
between the dancers and customers.
J.A. 61-62, 68.

established regulations
governing
the conduct of businesses engaged in
selling alcohol, every business in
the City is required to obtain and
maintain an occupational - license.
J.A. 80-82, 114. .

In a letter from the City's law
department, dated November 30r 1991,
the City offered to settle the
revocation
proceeding
if
the
plaintiff would cease offering nude
dancing and reactivate her liquor
license.
Another settlement offer
had been made on November 19, 1990.
The
plaintiff
• declined
the
settlement offers.
J.A. 23-24, 6364.

**3 The
charges
against the
plaintiff were based on these three
prostitution convictions obtained in
Hay, 1990.
The charges were lodged
on October 25, 199 0, against the
plaintiff.
He stated that the City
was aware at the time that these
charges were brought that the 3rass
Bull was offering nude dancing but
stated that this fact had no effect
on the City's decision.
Mr.
Parsons was present at the hearing
held by the City in January, 1991,
on the revocation of the plaintiff's
license.
As a result of this
hearing, the plaintiff's license was
suspended for s ix months and she was
placed on probation/ during which
period
of
probation
another
violation would have resulted in the
revocation
of
her
occupational
license.
J.A. 82-B5.

On January 21, 1991, a revocation
hearing was held before the City
commissioners.
The plaintiff was
present
and testified.
She
explained the efforts she made to
control her employees and offered
other evidence of the precautions
she
had
taken
to
prevent
prostitution on the premises.
This
evidence was uncontrovsrted by the
City.
J.A. 64-67.
At the hearing in the District
Court ten days later; the plaintiff
stated on cross-examination that she
was working in the club the night on
which two of her employees were
cited for prostitution.
She
testified, however, that she saw no
indication that these employees were
engaged in illegal conduct.
These
two employees were not arrested by
the undercover officer on the same
night as their violations and the
plaintiff stated that she had no
knowledge of the violations until
the latter part of April, 1990.
J.A. 77-78.

Unsupported by the record of the
hearing
before
the
City
commissioners, Mr. Parsons offered
his opinion that the City imposed
suspension rather than revocation
because the plaintiff attempted to
exercise more control over the
activities of her employees in her
business than did another licensee
whose charges had been heard by the
City commissioners on the same day.
Mr.
Parsons
testified
that

James Parsons testified on behalf
~of—the—e±tyi
**r^—Par sons—i-s—thecity manager and has held this
position since October lr 1339.
His responsibilities include filing
charges
against
occupational
licensees whose licenses may be
subject to revocation or suspension.
He filed the charges against the
plaintiff.
While the City has

pros^-irtrfci t-i-e&—&£#e-e£«—^e~-^Uki^i£y—
of
downtown
businesses
because
customers tend to avoid the downtown
shopping district due to these kinds
of illegal activities.
He further
stated that since many acts of
prostitution are performed by the
employees of establishments like the
plaintiff's, the City was attempting

3

to make these establishments assume
responsibility for the conduct of
their
employees
to
prevent
prostitution from occurring.
J.A.
86-87.
At the January hearings, the City
offered
no
evidence
tnat
the
plaintiff had not in fact taken
Bteps to control the behavior of the
Brass Bull's employees. No notice
was given to the plaintiff that the
City was concerned about the degree
or extent of control she exercised
over her employees.
No criminal
charg* was brought against the
plaintiff
for
permitting
prostitution
to
occur
on
the
premises of the Brass Bull. [FN31
J.A. 93-94Re denied that the City was
motivated hy a desire to eliminate
nude dancing in Newport in taking
its actions against the plaintiff.
The
City
is
investigating
occupational license violations m
other businesses and not all nude
dancing , establishments have been
charged with- license violations,
No charges have, however, been
processed against or are pending
agains- any other kind of business
than adult oriented establishments.
Nothing in the occupational license
ordinance
expressly permits
the
decision maker to consider any
mitigating
factors
in
the
determination of whether to revoke
or suspend a license and no standard
governs
the
decision
maker's
discretion as tc the nature of the
"""peircrlTy for"-a"-v±atrcittrr:
iJ-rA: S6- "
58, 103-106.

decision ccnceming the plaintiff1 s
club.
He testified that studies
have"been conducted that indicate a
correlation between prostitution,
both in "he clubs and in the
neighborhood cf the clubs, and the
operation
of
adult?
oriented
J.A. 111- 113.
establishments**4 In the written decision of the
Board" of Commissioners, the City
found
that
three
charges
of
prostitution had been alleged to
have occurred on the premises on the
same evening and had subsequently
been reduced to convictions. Based
on
these
convictions,
the
Commissioners
then
found
the
plaintiff guilty of a violation of
section
26-35(a)(1)
and
thus
temporarily
suspended
and
conditionally
revoked
her
occupational license.
J.A. 2-7-28.
Following the hearing on the
p^ aintiff's
application
for
injunctive relief, the District
Court entered its findings of fact
and conclusion of law.
The
District Court recognized that at
the hearing before the Commissioners
E he uncontradicted testimony of the
plaintiff was that she had taken
•precautions
•. •
to
prevent
prostitution,
and
denied
any
awareness
that prostitution had
taken place."
The plaintiff did
not deny that act3 of prostitution
aid occur on the premises of the
club.
J.A- 29, 34, 38.
As to the plaintiffs claim that
ch-e-or dxnancrer-tttr^srsne- ^ a t e t r e ± - f t e r - aue
process
rights
under
the
Fourteenth Amendment because it did
not require that she have knowledge
of the conduct of her employees and
imposed strict liability for such
conduct, the District Court rejected
contention
based
on
its
thig
conclusion that the police powers

Mr. Parsons admitted that he and
the City commissioners have publicly
expressed their opposition to adult
entertainment
establishments.
These same commissioners had the
authority to make the revocation

4

permitted the City to define the
violation so long as the ordinance
has a rational basis between its
requirements or penalties and a
legitimate
governmental
purpose,
inferring that sines the plaintiff
worked on the premises six days a
week, she should be presumed to be
aware or should be aware of any acts
of prostitution that occurred in the
club.
The Court addressed the
other issues raised by the plaintiff
and concluded that no injunction
should issue.
J.A. 3 8-3 9, 45.
II. ANALYSIS
While the plaintiff has raised a
number of issues, the Court has
concluded that the issue concerning
her lack of knowledge of the acts of
prostitution that occurred on the
premises is determinative.
The
effect of the ordinance is either tc
create a presumption of knowledge or
to eliminate any requirement of
knowledge on the part of the
licensee or operator of illegal
activities or prohibited conduct on
the premises based simply on the
fact of a conviction of a licensee's
employeeThe District Court was
persuaded that
"it is not an
irrational
presumption
that
if
prostitution were occurring she: did
know or should have known.rt
u.A.
29.
Since
the
plaintiff's
uncontradicted
evidence
was
diametrically
contrary
to
this
finding by the District Court, the
District Court effectively applied
an irrebuttable presumption but one
T R I E " pre'SramSTTHr^ffcr"^
necessarily or universally true-"
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,
95 S.Ct- 2457, 2468 (1975) .
In assessing the constitutionality
of a presumption, its operation on a
protectable right, such as the
property interest at stake in the

present case, to preclude a licensee
from putting on evidence in defense
or
from
having
that
evidence
meaningfully considered can result
in a violation of the guarantee of
due
process
embodied
in
the
Fourteenth Amendment.**5 rt ' [W]hat procedures due
process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise
nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by
governmental action.' "
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
22
S.Ct1208,
1212
(1972)
(citations omitted) .
One of the
fundamental purposes of the due
process clauses of the Constitution
" T is to allow the aggrieved party
the opportunity to present his case
and have its merits fairly judged.'
* Okeson v. Tolley School District
NO, 25, 760 P.2d 864, 863 (8th
Cir.), on reh 766 F.2d 37B (8th
Cir.l9B5) (citation omitted).
Tha City has exercised its police
powers
to
require
occupational
licenses
for
all
businesses
conducted within its jurisdiction.
In particular, it oversees adult
criented establishments based on
studies
showing
a
correlation
between the
operation
of
such
establishments and certain criminal
activities.
The City is attempting
to induce the operators of these
establishments
to
take
-respon:s±b±i-irry—for—tite—eon-dttefe—e-fempioyees who engage in illegal or
prohibited activities by threatening
suspension or revecation of their
occupational licenses.
The City
hopes that the reduction of the
level of such activities would help
reinvigorate the downtown shopping
district.
The Court does not

intend to question the validity of
rftis public policy or of the City's'
interest in preserving the viability
o£ its downtown business district*
The question in this case is whether
the means adopted by the City to
attempt to achieve these goals are
constitutional.
More specifically
seated, the question is whether the
application of
a conclusive or
irrebuttable
presumption
or
the
elimination
of
any
knowledge
requirements
is
consistent
with
meaningful due process in this case?

v. Barchi, 443 U.S.
55, 99 S.Ct.
2642, 2650 (1979).
As the Supreme
CPurt observed in Stanley,

The right to pursue an occupation
is a protected property right that
is subject to reasonable regulation.
Wilkeraon v. Johnson, 699 F,2d 325/
328 (Stii Cir.1983) . Moreover, once
a license or permit to engage in
some activity regulated by the St.ate
is issued by a - State, it is a
property right that cannot be denied
without adequate due process. Bell
v, Burscn, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct.
1586 (1971} ,
Furthermore, in the
present case, the plaintiff engages
in a "business that involves the
exercise of First Amendment'rights.

a licensee in the conduct of her
business and the exercise of First
Amendment rights. 92 S.Ct. at 1215.

**€ M[p]rocedure hyf presumption is
always
chea-cev
and easier than
individualized determination.
But,
when . . . the procedure forecloses
the determinative issues ..., when
it
explicitly
disdains
present
realities
in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important
interests of"

The presumption applied by the
District
Court
is
entirely
distinguishable from that permitted
joy the Supreme Court in Usery v.
Turner Eikhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1, 96 S.Ct* 2882 (1976), in which
tr~e
Supreme
Court
upheld
the
presumption
that
persons
with
certain
findings
regarding
pneumoconiosis would be entitled to
disability compensationSince the
statute at issue in Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co. was purely an economic
regulation that did not touch on or
affect fundamental rights, the Court
found no difficulty in accepting a
legislative
determination
(presumption)
that
evidence
of
disability
in certain
instances
w£uld require payment
of total
disability compensation. Id., at
2696*
Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 95
S.Ct.- at 2469-2470.
What is
-TK3irevort^y'^fooutr-T^
Turner Blkhcrn is that it does not
prevent any person from conducting a
business
or
engaging
in
an
occupation,
particularly
one
implicating the exercise of First
Amendment rights, and rather is part
of remedial social legislation. See
also Burlington Northern Railroad

Revocation precludes the licensee
from operating the business and thus
even a temporary
suspension or
revocation will have substantial
consequences
for
a
licensee.
"License revocations are so serious
as to be treated ' "in the nature of
criminal
proceedings."
'
. ..
Procedural
requirements
are
therefore rigorous for a license
revocation proceeding." Richards v.
SntanuneL~--CouiiLy—Ho3piLa±~ifotrhax i cy:
603 F.Supp. Si, 85 (S.D.Ga.1984)
•6'iting
American
Optometric
Association, Inc., 379 F.Supp. 175
(tf.D.Ga.),
affi'd
491 U*S.
386
(1974)),
A licensee is thus
entitled to have the opportunity to
be heard both at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.
Barry
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Co. -v. Department of Public Service
Regulation, 763 F.2dllQ6, 1113 (9th
Cir.1985).
in Vlandis v_ Kline, 412 U.s; 441,
93 S.Ct. 2230 (1973), the Supreme
Court of the United States observed
that
H

[t]he
State's
interest
in
administrative ease and certainty
cannot, in and of itself, . save [a]
conclusive
presumption
from
invalidity under the Due Process
Clause where there are otherwise
reasonable and practicable means of
establishing the pertinent facts, on
which the State's
objective
is
premised.
... Rather, standards of
due process require that the State
allow
such
an
individual
the
opportunity to present evidence. ..."
93 S.Ct. at 2236.
Due process
afforded to a person prior to
deprivation of a license must be
meaningful and appropriate to the
case:
'•It is a proposition which hardly
seems to need explication that a
hearing which excludes consideration
of an element essential to the
decision whether licenses of the
nature
here
involved
shall
be
suspended
does
not
meet
this
standard."
Bell v. Burson, 91 S.Ct. at 1591.
Another
case
involving
the
application of a presumption, Leary
"vr—Drri-tHd—Store's -—3-3-5—iW:—fr;—»S.Ct. 1532 (1969), also rejecting
administrative
convenience
a3
a
basis
for the
existence
of
a
presumption,
emphasized
that
a
presumptive
inference
of
guilty
knowledge based solely on presence
at a place in which illegal activity
occurs is generally arbitrary or

irrationalId., at 154B-1549.
Unless
"it
can be
said
with
substantial assurance that one in
possession of [an adult oriented
nightclub] is more likely than not
to know that" prostitution was
occurring on the premises of the
nightclub,
a
presumption
of
knowledge cannot be conclusively
applied to justify the revocation or
suspension of a license to operate
such a business. Id-, at 1553.
**7 in addition, although the
Pistrict Court presumed that the
plaintiff knew that prostitution was
occurring on the premises of the
Brass Bull, the wording of the
ordinance would not require the
application of a presumption of
knowledge to obtain a revocation.
All that is necessary to warrant
revocation under this ordinance as
written
is
for
any
employee,
servant, or agent of the licensee to
have been convicted even once of
violating any ordinance of the City
or any criminal law of the State of
Kentucky.
Consequently, if a
bookkeeper for the plaintiff was
convicted of embezzlement from the
plaintiff,
the
plaintiffs
occupational
license
could
be
revoked, despite the fact that the
plaintiff would be highly unlikely
to kno^i that her bookkeeper was
engaged in this kind of criminal
activity, since if she were aware of
it she would probably take some
action to stop it.
The ordinance
is thus a strict liability provision
and the District Court's finding of
-presumed
knowledge
was—:—bothunnecessary under the ordinance as
drafted to obtain a revocation and
created an essentially irrebuttable
presumption that was contrary to the
uncontested
evidence
that
the
plaintiff did not know that her
employees
were
engaged
in
prostitution and that she took

reasonable
steps to attempt to
prevent
such
conduct
on
her
premises.
Nothing
that
the
plaintiff could have shown at her
hearing
before
the
City
coTimissioners or in the District
Court
would have prevented the
ordinance from being applied as
written.
Universal Restoration,
Inc. v. United States. 798 F.2d
14QD, 1406 (Fed-Cir.l986)Cf. .
This ordinance is entirely unlike
the statute upheld in Hvamstad v.
Suhier,
915* F.2d
1213
(8th
Cir.1990), in which a pattern of
convictions was required to permit
the abatement of a nuisance by city
officials.
Obviously, a pattern of
convictions of which the operator is
given
or
has
notice
provides
knowledge
that such conduct is
occurring on the premises.
As the
Court of Appeals in Hvamstad noted,
"the
abatement
statute
... is
designed
to
encourage
property
owners to abate the basis for the
nuisance themselves by delivering
notice of the convictions to the
owners."
Id-, at 1220.
Further,
the statute in Hvamstad was limited
to
certain
enumerated
offenses
related to the operation of the
business and did not allow abatement
proceedings to be premised en all
types of convictions, whether or not
reasonably related to the nature of
the business being conducted.
Hot
all
prohibitable
conduct
is
necessarily related to a State's
legitimate interest in regulating or
licensing a particular occupation.

is
net
limited
to
offenses
(prostitution, solicitation, service
of minors, etc*) occurring on the
premises that would be reasonably
related to preventing or curing the
purported social evils or secondary
effects
at
which r the City
is
claiming to aim and rather extends
to any conduct that would be a
violation of a City ordinance or a
Stats
criminal
law,
such
as
embezzlement, regardless cf whether
such a violation would have any
relation to the kinds of problems
that
the
City
claims
it
was
attempting ro prevent or to cure.
The
ordinance
goes
beyond
the
purposes of preventing or curing the
secondary effects supposedly flowing
from the operation of establishments
like the Brass Bull and reaches
conduct that, while may otherwise be
prohibited by the State or its
political subdivisions, would not
result in or contribute to the
secondary effects in the downtown
area in which -chese establishments
are located but would nevertheless
permit
the
revocation
of
the
plaintiff's
license
without
achieving or furthering nhe City's
purported goal of eliminating these
secondary effects. [FN4]
This is
clearly arbitrary or irrational,
**8 The ordinance permits the
revocation of occupational licenses
without
any
showing
that
the
operator had any control over the
conduct of employees or that the
operator
willfully
ignored
prohibited activities or otherwise
knew—of";—shou-1 d-^ha-^e—known—a-fr,—oxrcondoned illegal conduct on the part
of the operator's employees, agents,
or servants. Cf. Finer Foods Sales
Co., Inc. v. Block, 703 F.2d 774,
777-778
(D.C~ftpp*1983).
A3
recognized in Chulchian v. City of
Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27, 32 (7th
Cir.1980), "because of the knowledge

A licensing regulation must: contain
requirements that are "rationally
related to an applicant's fitness
for the occupation."
Chalfy v.
Turofif,
804
F.2d
20,
23
(2d
Cir.1966) .
See also Vruno v.
Schwarswalder, 600 F.2d 124, 129130 (6th Cir.1979).
The ordinance
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requirement, the ordinance doe3 not
penalize a licensee for an isolated
incident over which he has no
control."
In contrast, in Genusa
v. City • of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203
(7th Cir.1980), the same Circuit
Court
of Appeals
as
decided
Chulchian observed that an ordinance
permitting
revocation
if
the
licensee allowed "anything to occur
on licensed premises that is in any
manner unlawful," id., at 1221,
would be constitutional only " [o)n
the assumption that [the City] does
not mean by this provision to
enlarge the licensee's vicarious
criminal
liability
beyond
traditional bounds
» Id.
Courts
faced
with
similar
provisions in State law have readily
recognized that equal protection or
due
process
guarantees
are
implicated when use of convictions
unrelated
to
the
government's
legitimate purposes deprive a person
of the right to engage in an
occupation, often relying on Schware
vr Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232, 77 S.Ct. 752 (1957), which held
that
any
qualification
or
requirement for an occupation must
bear a rational relation to the
person's fitness to engage in the
particular occupation or business,
77

S.Ct.

at

756,

All

such

requirements must be tailored to
promote the government's interest in
regulation of the occupation, based
on the nature of the crimes or
offenses for which convictions may
have
been
obtained
and their
""r^Tatrtun—to—the— fttnws—of—sfcelicensee
to
engage
in
that
particular occupation. See, e.g.,
. Gregg v. Laweon, 732 F.Supp. 84 9,

854-856 (E.D.Tenn.1989);
schanuel
v. Anderson, 546 F.Supp. 519, 523524 (S.D.111.1982), aff'd 708 F.2d
316 (7th Cir.1983).
Without both a
sufficient showing by the City that

the plaintiff's fitness to operate
the Brass Bull was affected by the
conviction of any of her employees
for acts of prostitution or other
relevant criminal conduct committed
on the premises, such as that she
knew or should have known about or
condoned such conduct, and without
allowing
the
plaintiff
the
opportunity to present evidence in
defense, fairly considered by the
decision maker, the City may not
revoke or suspend the plaintiffs
occupational license m violation of
her right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment*
Consequently, the provisions of the
ordinance now under review cannot
pass constitutional scrutiny under
the rational relation test and thus
violate the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
These
provisions permit the City to
deprive an operator of a protected
property . interest
without
any
relation to the evils at which the
ordinance is allegedly aimed and, '
having no requirement that the
operator know or should know from
the circumstances that violations- of
City ordinances or State statutes
are occurring on the licensed
premises, the ordinance precludes
the licensee from showing that the
licensee had no knowledge of any
such violations.
The ordinance
thus
constitutes
an
improper
imposition of strict liability or
creates an irrebuttable presumption
and is overbroad.
-I^-lT~eONCljJ5SI-eN
**9 Accordingly, the Court is cf
the opinion that section 26-39(a)(l)
of the ordinances of the City of
Newport
is unconstitutional as
presently written. The order of the
District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky is REVERSED and
this case is REMANDED for action

consistent with nhe opinion of this
Court.
FN* The Honorable Leon Jordan,
U.S. District Judge for the
Eastern District of Tennessee,
sitting by designation.
?N1. All references to the
record will be to the Joint
Arman^-iv of t-he _nart:ies,
with
r
the

notation * J . A .

ana

tne

relevant page or pages in the
Joint Appendix.
FN2. Compare the provisions of
the
ordinance
declared
unconstitutional
in Bayside
Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson,
470 F.Supp. 1149, 1142-1146
(M.D.Fla.1979) .
FN3. Nothing in the record
indicates that a history of
prostitution existed at the
plaintiff's club and; rather,
the
record
supports
the
conclusion that these were the
first
citations
for
such
activities at the Brass Bull.
FN4. While the court does not
address the issue of whether
the ordinance in the present
context violates the First:
Amendment, the Court notes
-hat
the
Supreme
Court
recently
held
that
nude
dancing is not unprotected
expression, Barnes v. Glen
Theater, Inc., ill S.Ct. 2456,
2463 (1991) , and this Court

-has

re^"errtT3nd

permit trrrxg-

cccupational licenses to be
revoked when it would violate
the First Amendment, City of
Paducah
v.
investment
Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d
463, 469-470 (6th Cir.1986).
END OP DOCUMENT
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